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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

WOODLAND THEATRES, INC.,
a corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No. 14440

vs.

Case No. 14441

ABC INTERMOUNTAIN THEATRES,
INC., a corporation, and
PLITT INTERMOUNTAIN THEATRES,
INC., a corporation,
Defendants-Respondents,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
INTRODUCTION
The plaintiff-appellant Woodland Theatres, Inc.,
(hereinafter "Woodland") hereby appeals from the trial court's
Order of Summary Judgment in favor of the defendant-respondent
Plitt Intermountain Theatres, Inc., (hereinafter "Plitt") in
separate actions filed by Woodland for unlawful detainer and
for breach of lease and termination of leasehold.
On or about March 9, 1971, the plaintiff-appellant
Woodland entered into a lease agreement with ABC Intermountain
Theatres, Inc., (hereinafter "ABC").

ABC leased real

property commonly known and referred to as the Woodland Drive-in
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Theatre from Woodland for a period of fifteen (15) years.
By the terms of the lease agreement, ABC covenanted to keep
the theatre premises in good repair and to make certain
improvements to the physical plant of the theatre. ABC
further covenanted not to assign the leasehold without
securing written permission from the lessor.

The lease pro-

vided for a fixed monthly rental plus percentages of the gross
gate receipts and concession sales above certain amounts.
ABC flagrantly and repeatedly breached the lease
agreement by assigning the leasehold without Woodland's
authorization, by allowing the theatre premises to deteriorate
physically and by not making the improvements to the physical
plant of the theatre clearly required by the lease terms.
ABC and Plitt did not run the Woodland Drive-in Theatre
business in good faith, and consequently, Woodland received
negligible amounts under the percentage rental provisions of
the lease agreement.

In light of ABC's breaches and lack of

good faith performance of the lease agreement, Woodland filed
two actions: one under the Utah unlawful detainer statute,
U.C.A. § 78-36-3; and one for breach of the lease and termination
of the leasehold.
On December 12, 1975, ABC's assignee Plitt moved for
summary judgment in both actions on the ground that Woodland
I
had waived any and all claims for breaches, violations and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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forfeitures under the lease agreement by accepting rent,
and that as a matter of law Woodland had no claim for
damages under the percentage rental provisions of the lease.
The trial court granted defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment. Whereupon Woodland brought this appeal.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I.

Did the trial court err in holding that as a

matter of law Woodland waived the defendants-respondents1
forfeiture of the leasehold by accepting rental payments?
II.

Did the trial court err in holding that as a

matter of law Woodland waived all of the defendants-respondents'
breaches of the lease agreement by accepting rental payments?
III.

Did the trial court err in holding that as a

matter of law there was no implied covenant on the part of
the defendants-respondents to operate the Woodland Drive-in
Theatre in good faith so that Woodland could receive the full
benefit of performance under the lease agreement?

PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW
After the complaints in these actions had been filed
and before completion of discovery, the defendant-respondent

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Plitt moved, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, for summary judgment in both actions and for a
consolidated hearing of its motions. Woodland responded with
a memorandum of points and authorities in opposition to Plitt's
motions for summary judgment.

The hearing on the motions,

consolidated pursuant to stipulation of counsel for the
parties, was held on December 12, 1975. At the close of the
hearing, the court granted Plitt's motion for summary judgment
regarding Woodland's claims of forfeiture of the leasehold
and breaches of the lease agreement arising from alleged
failures to repair, maintain and improve the physical plant
of the Woodland Drive-In Theatre.

The plaintiff-appellant

Woodland files this brief seeking to reverse the trial court's
summary judgment rulings.

,

H

k

STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

The Lease Agreement and Its Provisions.

On or about March 9, 1971, the plaintiff-appellant
Woodland entered into a lease agreement with the defendant
ABC.

(A copy of the lease agreement is attached as Exhibit A.)

Woodland Theatres, Inc., is a Utah corporation owning real
property known as the Woodland Drive-in Theatre, located at
4005 South, 700 East, Salt Lake County, Utah.

According to the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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provisions of the lease agreement, Woodland leased the
Woodland Drive-In Theatre to ABC for a fifteen (15) year
term, with an option to renew the lease for an additional five
(5) years.

(See Exhibit A, Paragraphs 1 and 20.)

ABC agreed to pay a fixed annual rental of $32,500.00
in equal monthly installments throughout the term of the
lease.

In addition, ABC covenanted to pay an annual percentage

rental of fifteen percent (15%) of the gross admission receipts
above $183,333.00 and fifteen percent (15%) of the gross
concession receipts in excess of $65,000.00. The lease
provided that ABC's records of gross admission and concession
receipts would be open for Woodland's inspection during regular
business hours.

(See Exhibit A, Paragraph 2.)

Respecting maintenance, ABC covenanted, inter alia,
to keep the theatre premises in good repair, replacing worn
out or damaged equipment at its own expense.
Paragraph 8.)

(See Exhibit A,

ABC further agreed to make improvements to the

theatre premises, including enlarging the snack bar to
approximately double its initial size, oiling and spreading
a layer of rock chips on the theatre grounds, resurfacing
portions of the theatre premises and repainting the theatre
screen.

(See Exhibit A, Paragraphs 7, 25, 28.)

ABC also

covenanted not to assign the leasehold without obtaining
Woodland's written permission, not to be unreasonably withheld.
(See Exhibit A, Paragraph 11.)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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B.

The Defendants-Respondents' Performance Under

The Lease,
ABC only operated the Woodland Drive-In Theatre
until the beginning of the year, 1974. At that time, ABC
assigned the lease to a successor corporation, Plitt Intermountain Theatres, Inc., and Plitt and its employees took over
the management of the theatre without any notice being given
to Woodland.

The substitution of Plitt for ABC constituted

an unauthorized transfer of the leasehold in clear violation
of the express terms of Paragraph 11 of the lease agreement
providing that "[t]he Lessee [ABC] covenants and agrees that
it will not assign this lease or enter into any sublease of
the premises or any part thereof, without the written consent
of the Lessor... ."

(See Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's

Interrogatories, Answer to Interrogatory No. 2.)
Neither Plitt nor ABC have adequately maintained
the physical plant of the theatre, and it has deteriorated both
visually and operationally over time. On an inspection of
the theatre premises on June 24, 1974, Woodland found the
theatre grounds strewn with papers and other garbage, the
fence leaning and broken down in places, and water running through
part of the theatre from a broken sprinkler connection.
Several speaker posts were broken, the screen tower paint
was peeling and the screen was bare in places.
-6-

The snack bar
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addition was blocked off from the operating portion of the
concession area by a cinder block wall, and the electrical
system of the theatre was partially burned out, with auxiliary
ground cables running to the back of the snack bar supplying
power.

(Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Interrogatories,

Answer to Interrogatory No. 4.)
At a further inspection at the theatre on July 26,
1974, employees of Woodland observed the west and north
driveways of the theatre broken and pitted in places, the theatre
screen stained with rust and its paint peeling, several

;

speaker posts broken down and many water connections broken.
Many of the bubble lights at the entrance to the theatre
were broken or removed, the fence was weathered and unpainted,
and many speakers previously removed were unreplaced.

At that

time, the broken sprinkler, noted before, remained unrepaired,
and some of the wiring through the theatre was still not
functioning.

(Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Interroga-

tories, Answer to Interrogatory No. 4.)

The plaintiff-appellant's

representatives inspected the theatre again on July 31, 1974
and found that the deteriorating conditions observed on
July 26 had not been corrected.

In addition, they found that

there were peeling paint and standing water within the operating snack bar, and the surface of the theatre was in need of
an application of oil and rock chips. The fence was patched
-7Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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with odd pieces of wood and propped up by two-by-fours in
placesf and two large wires taped to an open junction box
were exposed, with a large "Danger" sign painted near them.

Seventy (70) speakers were totally inoperable, and

forty-seven (47) more gave poor sound.

(Plaintiff's

Response to Defendant's Interrogatories, Answer to Interrogatory No. 4.)
By allowing the physical plant of the Woodland c-Drive-in Theatre to deteriorate to a great extent, ABC and
Plitt undermined the business of the theatre.

The facilities

that they provided were inadequate to accommodate the
theatre's patrons.

For example, on or about June 24, 1975,

Eugene Woodland was contacted by Kenny Lloyd, local branch
manager for Twentieth Century Fox.

Mr. Lloyd reported that

during a showing of a Fox film at the Woodland Drive-in
Theatre, only 518 speakers were operational, and the theatre
was turning away hundreds of patrons due to the unavailability
of operable speakers.

(Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's

Interrogatories, Answer to Interrogatory No. 4.)
.»-•• ABC had covenanted in the lease agreement to enlarge
i

the snack bar to approximately double its size at the inception
of the agreement within six (6) months of the effective date
of the lease.

(See Exhibit A, Paragraph 7.)

An addition to

the snack bar was constructed, but until August of 1975 it was

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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blocked off from the operating portion of the snack bar and
used solely for storage.

(Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's

Interrogatories, Answer to Interrogatory No. 5.)

Projected

increases in concession sales were thus stifled by the
defendants-respondents' lack of good faith in implementing
the provisions of the lease agreement mandating an addition
to the snack bar.
C.

Woodland's Suits

Woodland filed its action against ABC and Plitt for
unlawful detainer on August 21, 1974 and its action for breach
of the lease and termination of the leasehold on September 24,
1974.

Prior to those filings, a notice of default and notice to

quit the Woodland Drive-In Theatre premises were served on ABC
and Plitt on August 2, 1974, and from that date, Woodland did
not accept rental payments for subsequent periods of the
defendants-respondents' occupancy of the theatre premises.
(Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 6-7.)
Negotiations aimed at settling the differences
between Woodland and the defendants-respondents were conducted
by counsel for the parties, and a tentative agreement was
reached in December, 1974. Assuming that the settlement would
be ratified by the defendants-respondents, Woodland accepted
rental payments soon thereafter as a good faith gesture,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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fully intending to continue its actions if the settlement should fall through.

When the terms of the negotiated

settlement were repudiated by the defendants-respondents,
Woodland continued with the prosecution of its lawsuits,
(Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant 's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 7.)
The defendant-respondent Plitt subsequently moved
for summary judgment in both of Woodland's actions on the ground
that by accepting rental payments, Woodland thereby waived all
of Plittfs and ABC's breaches of the lease agreement,

Plitt

also argued that as a matter of law there was no implied
obligation under the lease agreement to make payments under
its percentage rental provisions, introducing no factual
evidence in support of its argument.

The trial court granted

summary judgment in Plitt's favor on Woodland's claims of
forfeiture of the leasehold and breaches of the lease agreement
through failure to repair, maintain and improve the theatre
premises.

However, its rulings were based solely on the

flat, legal propositions advanced by the defendants-respondents,
and it made no factual determinations relating to Woodland's
claims.

Woodland appeals to this Court to reverse the trial

court's holdings and reinstate its actions for unlawful
detainer and breach of the lease and termination of the leasehold.
-10Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ARGUMENT
!•

The trial court erred in finding that as a

matter of law, Woodland waived the defendants-respondents1
forfeiture of the leasehold and breaches off the lease agreement by accepting rent.

Initially it should be noted that

defendants1 motion for summary judgment was based solely
upon the fact that plaintiff had accepted rent.

Defendant

did not assert or show that as a matter of uncontroverted
fact, plaintiff had expressed or demonstrated an intent to
waive its claims of forfeiture.

The defendant did not assert

or show that as a matter of uncontroverted fact the plaintiff
had undertaken activities which clearly constituted a waiver
of its claims of forfeiture.

The defendant relied solely

on the proposition that the acceptance of rent by a landlord
as a matter of law, and without regard to the attendant
factual circumstances, waives all past claims of forfeiture
and breach.

That proposition is clearly erroneous and the

Court's acceptance thereof in its order of summary judgment
is improper and should be reversed.
A.

Woodland did not waive the defendants-respondents'

forfeiture of the leasehold by accepting rent. Waiver is
uniformly recognized as the intentional relinquishment of a
known right.

See Lucas Hunt Village Co. v. Klein, 218 S.W.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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2d 595,, 599 (Mo. 1949).

In the disposition of a claim of

waiver, it is the intention of the party charged with making
the waiver which is controlling.

See Brazeal v. Bokelman,

270 F.2d 943, 947 (8th Cir. 1959); In re Wil-Low Cafeterias,
Inc., 95 F.2d 306, 309 (2d Cir. 1938).
Accordingly, a determination of whether a landlord
has waived a right or claim of forfeiture to a leasehold is
a factual question concerning the intentional relinguishment
by the landlord.

Concerning the showing which must be made

in order to establish a waiver, the Missouri Supreme Court
in Lucas Hunt Village Co. v. Klein, 218 S.W.2d 595, 599 (Mo. 1949),
unauthorized subletting, affirmed the rule that:
. . . [T]he intention of the.party charged with
making the waiver is controlling, and if not
shown by express declaration, but implied by
conduct, there must be a clear, unequivocal and
decisive act of the party showing such purpose,
and so manifestly consistent with and indicative
of an intention to waive that no other reasonable
explanation is possible. Lucas Hunt Village Co.
v. Kelin, 218 S.W.2d 595, 599 (Mo. 1949).
See also B.J.M. Realty Corp. v. Ruggieri, 326 F.2d 281, 284
(2d Cir. 1963); Brazeal v. Bokelman, 270 F.2d 943, 947 (8th

-12-
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Cir. 1959); In re Wil-Low Cafeterias, Inc., 95 F.2d 306,
309 (2d Cir. 1938); Miller v, Reidy, 260 P. 358, 360 (Cal.
1927).
In suits involving a claim of forfeiture of a
leasehold., courts have been unwilling to find claims of
forfeiture or breach waived by the mere acceptance of rent
in circumstances in which the landlord had evidenced a
contrary intent.

In that regard courts have recognized the

institution of litigation against a tenant as a clear
indication that the landlord has elected and is pursuing its
right of forfeiture despite the fact that rental payments
are made in the interim.
For example, in the case of Fogel v. Hogan, 496
P.2d 322, 324 (Colo. 1972), defendants filed a cross claim
to terminate a lease, asserting as a basis therefore that the
premises had not been maintained as provided in the lease.
The tenant argued that the landlord had waived its claims of
breach by accepting rental payments during the pendency of
the action.

The Colorado Supreme Court of Appeals, however,

held that:
. . . when a tenant continues in possession
pending a determination of an action brought
by the landlord to enforce a forfeiture,
the tenant is under an obligation to pay
rent and acceptance of these payments does
not constitute waiver of the breach.
(496 P.2d at 324.)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Similarly, in Merkowitz v, Mahoney, 215 P. 2d 317
(Colo. 1949), a landlord brought suit to repossess a leasehold
charging that the tenant had operated the premises in violation
of the law and in breach of the lease.

The tenant argued

that the landlord's acceptance of rent during the pendency
of the action constituted a waiver of its claims of forfeiture.
Rejecting the tenant's argument, the Supreme Court of Colorado
stated:
Where the landlord upon breach of a covenant
gives notice of forfeiture and brings an action
for possession/ his suit presumably constitutes
a final election to terminate the lease. The
lease being terminated, the landlord is entitled
to possession, and neither the landlord nor tenant
is further bound by provisions of the lease as to
the remainder of its term. However, where the
right of the landlord to forfeit the term is disputed
by the tenant and he continues in possession
pending a determination of the action brought
by the landlord to enforce a forfeiture, the
tenant is under obligation of payment to the
landlord for his possession. (Id..at 320.)
The court held that although a landlord could agree
during the pendency of litigation to accept back rent and
terminate litigation, a determination of whether payments
accepted during litigation were pursuant to such an agreement
would have to be made from the circumstances of the case.
(215 P.2d at 321.)

The court, however, clearly held that the

receipt of rental does not necessarily constitute waiver.
that regard, the court adopted the reasoning expressed in
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated
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In

Myers v. Herskowitz, 165 P. 1031, 1033 (Cal. 1917), quoting
that decision as follows:

—

The tenant having succeeded in retaining possession of the premises during the pendency
of the action, plaintiff was entitled to compensation therefor, and after the benefit had
been received by the defendant the plaintiff
might reasonably accept such compensation to
which he was entitled without being held to
have waived the right of action which he was
then prosecuting.

See also Fogel v. Hogan, 496 P.2d 322 (Colo. 1972); Wecht v.
Anderson, 444 P.2d 501, 505 (Nev. 1968).
In this case the clear intent expressed and demonstrated at all times by the plaintiff-appellant was to fully
litigate its claims of forfeiture.

At no time did Woodland

express or imply that its claims for forfeiture or breach
would be dropped absent a full settlement with defendantsrespondents, nor has it by its course of action given any
indication to that effect.

In this regard, it is important

to note that defendants-respondents made no claim whatsoever
that plaintiff-appellant led them to believe it was waiving
its claims of forfeiture.

Defendants-respondents did not

assert that they held that belief in reliance upon any actions
of the plaintiff-appellant.

On the contrary, defendants-

respondents rely solely on the fact that Woodland accepted
the rent for defendants1respondents' possession of its
property during the pendency of the actions to defeat

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Woodland's claims.

Such a superficial analysis cannot support

summary judgment, particularly in the absence of any factual
determinations whatsoever.

The trial court's order of

summary judgment should be reversed and Woodland's claims
of forfeiture of the leasehold reinstated.
B.

Woodland did not waive the defendants-respondents'

breaches of the lease agreement by accepting rent. The
principle that a clearly demonstrated intent is essential to
a finding of waiver applies with even greater force to
substantive breaches of the lease agreement than to the forfeitures discussed in the preceding section.

A lessor does

not forfeit all rights to enforce the terms of a lease
agreement by accepting rental payments.

Nevertheless, defen-

dants based their motion for summary judgment

on the ground

that acceptance of rent by a landlord with knowledge of
breaches of the lease agreement, without more, waives those
breaches as a matter of law, and its motion was granted by
the trial court.
To the contrary, courts have held that material
breaches of a lease agreement are not waived by the acceptance
of rent.

See Atkinson v. Trehan, 334 N.Y.S. 2d 293 (1972);

Wecht v. Anderson, 444 P.2d 501, 504-05 (Nev. 1968); Klein
v. Longo, 34 A.2d 359, 360 (Mun. Ct. of Appeals,

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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D.C. 1943).

In the Wecht case, the lessee had covenanted

to construct a fifty (50) ton capacity retort for refining
mercury on mineral-rich land by a certain date and never
fulfilled that obligation.

In the meantime, the lessor

continued to accept rent but ultimately sought to terminate
the lease on the basis of the lessee's breach in not
building the retort.

The court ruled that the lessor had not

waived the lessee's breach by accepting rental payments
with knowledge of the breach.
In Fogel v. Hogan, 496 P.2d 322 (Colo. 1972), the
lessee failed adequately to maintain the leased premises and
thus breached the maintenance provision of the lease agreement.

Id. at 324.

In a suit filed by the lessee against the

lessors, the lessors filed a cross-claim for termination of
the leasehold and continued to collect rental payments throughout the pendency of the action.

The lessee argued that the

lessors had waived any breaches of the lease agreement by
accepting rent while their action proceeded.

However, the

court disagreed, finding that the lessee was obligated to
continue making rental payments as long as he remained on the
leased premises.

Id.

The factual situation in the Fogel case

is strikingly similar to that in the actions presently before
this Court, and the same principle should apply.
To accept the defendants-respondents' argument that
the acceptance of rent waives all foregoing breaches of a lease
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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agreement as a matter of law would narrowly limit the choice
of remedies available to a lessor faced with a lessee's
breaches.

The lessor would be left with the options of

foregoing rent while filing suit to terminate the leasehold,
or of accepting rent while suffering the consequences of the
lessee's breaches without redress.

The proposition is absurd

on its face.
A landlord is fully entitled to enforce the terms
of a lease without requiring its termination.

The injured

lessor thus may file suit to require compliance with provisions of a lease agreement or to secure an award of damages for
the lessee's breaches while receiving payments of rent.

i

-18Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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II.

The trial court erred in granting summary

judgment on Woodland's claims regarding the defendants-respondents1
implied obligations under the lease agreement.

In its

complaint for breach of the lease and termination of the leasehold, Woodland alleges that the defendants-respondents
breached the lease agreement by failing to operate the
Woodland Drive-in Theatre in a prudent and businesslike
manner.

In addition to the fixed annual rental established

in the lease agreement, ABC covenanted to pay an annual .
percentage rental of fifteen percent (15%) of the concession
receipts above $65f000.00.

(See Exhibit Af Paragraph 2.)

The complaint avers and plaintiff-appellant will show, if
allowed to proceed at trial, that defendants-respondents
failed to fulfill their covenants to maintain and improve
the theatre and, in fact, were grossly negligent in its
maintenance and operation.

The direct consequence of defen-

dants-respondents' manifold breaches of the lease agreement
was to totally frustrate plaintiff-appellant's opportunity
to realize the benefits intended from the percentage rental
provision.
Defendants-respondents moved for summary judgment
respecting plaintiff-appellant's claims under the percentage
rental provisions solely on the ground that as a matter of
law a percentage rental provision does not give rise to any
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duties on the part of the lessee respecting operation or
maintenance of the theatre in order to produce revenue
therefrom.

In their motion, defendants-respondents do not

attempt to demonstrate any uncontroverted facts concerning the
activities of the parties in this case or their intent in
subscribing to the subject provision of the lease. Defendantsrespondents make no attempt to demonstrate what the parties
intended by the lease agreement nor to demonstrate that on
the basis of the facts involved in this case, duties averred
by the plaintiff-appellant could not have arisen. Defendantsrespondents' sole basis for the motion for summary judgment is
the single proposition that as a matter of law a percentage
lease provision does not give rise to the duties averred by
plaintiff-appellant.

^

Defendants-respondents1 motion must fail for,
inter alia, two basic reasons. First, the controlling authorities
fail to support defendants-respondents' contention that, as
a matter of law, percentage lease agreements do not give
rise to duties concerning operation of and production of
income from a leasehold.

Second, the controlling authorities

clearly hold that the duties attendent to a percentage lease
agreement can only be ascertained by a determination of the
intent of the parties and of the surrounding facts and
circumstances.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The cases cited by defendants-respondents make
it clear that in order to adjudicate the rights of a lessor
under a percentage lease agreement, the court must make specific
reference to the facts before it. Further, the only Utah case
cited by defendants-respondents concerning a situation similar
to that before the Court clearly demonstrates the Utah
Supreme Court's embrace of the principle that a lessee under
a percentage lease agreement may have substantive obligations
concerning the operation of its business on the premises.
In Flowers v. Wrights, 227 P.2d 768 (Utah 1951), the Court
considered a claim by a lessor for additional rentals which it
attributed to the business done by a sublessee.

In this

case, the lessee had agreed to pay a rental based upon a
percentage of its total sales. At the time the lease was
entered into, however, the Court held that the lessee was
given the right to sublease and the parties contemplated
that the sales of the sublessee would not be included within
the terms of the percentage rental agreement.

In discussing

the legal standards applicable generally to a percentage
lease situation, the court cited the case of Cissna Loan
Company v. Baron, 149 Wash, 386, 270 P. 1022 (1928).

The

court stated that it did not disagree with the findings in
the Cissna case but distinguished the case on the grounds that
the lease before it specifically excluded the sales of the
sublessee.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In distinguishing the Cissna case", the Utah Supreme
Court held that unlike the case before'TfcV in the Cissna case
^ there was no clear contemplation at the time of signing the
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lease that such a move of departments would take place, O D
Comparing those facts to the instant suit, the parties clearly
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a ysa oj 5»e:r*>* hBn ^ * ^ r ' ^ ^
expressed the affirmative covenants which Wbtrld haife direct
bearing on the gross percentage rental figure.

This is not

a case where a lessee has moved a department or moved ari°
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aspect of business. Rather, it is a case where the lessee
a iii - •

has intentionally and negligently failed to fulfill theUJ

p n l
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covenants of the agreement which have direct implication in
the profitability of the business.

Further/ the Cissna case

and the adoption of its principles in Flowers by the Utah
aril *|8£ei) ££CU .1 OVSr.'^SE .ifaBW.eftr ^dv^-- ^ . • ^ ^ - n
Supreme Court clearly support the fihding^«Fobligations on
the part of a lessee under a gross rental provision to conduct
iBifj
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its business in good faith in order that the lessor has %
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fair opportunity to realize the benefit of tftat provision.
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In this respect, it is important also to note that
in Flowers v. Wrights, the Utah Supreme Court clearly stated
that an intentional effort on the part of the lessee to
reduce the percentage rental was clearly actionable.

In this

respect, the Supreme Court stated:
Doubtless the reason why the lessee's right
to sub-let space was so restricted was to
prevent the lessee from using the right to
sub-lease space as a device to reduce the
percentage rental which would ordinarily
accrue to the lessor. Numerous cases are
cited by the plaintiffs to the effect that a
lessee cannot use the authority to sub-let
as such a device. With that principle we
are in complete accord.
The holding of the Utah Supreme Court is consistent
with the standards embraced by Williston on Contracts, Rev.
Ed., Vol. 1, § 104A, at 357:
A third class of cases, not wholly inconsistent
with the first, finds from the business
situation, from the conduct of the parties,
and from the startlingly disproportionate
burden otherwise cast upon one of them, a
promise implied in fact by the seller to
continue in good faith production or sales,
or on the part of the buyer to maintain his
business or plant as a going concern and to
take its bona fide requirements. In other
words, this view implies an obligation to carry
out the contract in the way anticipated, and not
for purposes of speculation to the injury of
the other party.
Embracing the principle above-referenced, the Court
in State Auto & Cas. Underwriters v. Salisbury, 494 P.2d
529, 531 (Utah 1972), stated:

-23-
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Arising from what is commonly known and
accepted as to the customs and experience
in the everyday affairs of life, the parties
each has the right to assume that the other
will perform the duties he agrees to with
reasonable care, competence, diligence and
good faith, even though such terms are not
expressly spelled out in the contract... .
See also Beaugureau v. Beaugureau, 463 P.2d 540, 542 (Ariz.
1970); Coleman Eng'r Co. v. North Amer. Aviation Inc., 420
P.2d 713, 720 (Cal. 1966); Miller v. Othello Packers, Inc.,
410 P.2d 33, 34 (Wash. 1966).
In Flowers v. Wrights, however, the court clearly
found that the good faith of the lessee had not been questioned
in any respect.

In this case, the lack of good faith of the

lessee is the thrust of plaintiff-appellant1s claims which
are the subject of defendants-respondents' motion.
Further, supportive of the Utah Supreme Court's
finding are a substantial number of decisions from other
jurisdictions which, in contravention to the findings of
the cases cited by defendants, clearly impose upon a lessee
under a percentage lease agreement obligations to fulfill
the fair expectations of the lessor under that provision.
In Selber Bros., Inc. v. Newstadt's Shoe Stores,
194 So. 579 (La. 1940), the Supreme Court of Louisiana held
that a lessor stated a valid cause of action seeking additional
rent under a percentage rental agreement complaining of lessee's
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substitution of a store specializing in close-out sales of
cheap brands and slow-moving old styles of shoes for a
"high-class and fashionable store/1

194 So. at 580. The

lessor obviously intended that the lessee would maintain a
quality merchandise shoe store on the leasehold premises during
the lease term, but once again the ruling was made in spite of
a minimum rental provision that had not been breached.
In this case, at the time the lease was entered into,
the clear intent of the parties was that the Woodland Drive-In
Theatre would be profitably managed.

Otherwise, the percentage

rental provisions and the corresponding provisions for
plaintiff-appellant1s inspection of defendants-respondents1
financial records would be meaningless.

(See Exhibit A,

Paragraph 2.) Paragraph 7 of the lease agreement expressly
provides that the lessee is to approximately double the size
of the snack bar-concessions area. After substantial delay,
defendants built an addition to the snack bar but blocked
it off with a cinder block wall and used it solely for storage.
That action breached an express covenant of the lease agreement as well as an implied covenant to run the theatre
concessions in good faith in a businesslike manner,
In Mayfair Operating Corp. v. Bessemer Properties, Inc.,
7 So.2d 342 (Fla. 1942), the Supreme Court of Florida held
that a lessee of a movie theatre was obligated to keep the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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theatre operating all year and do its best to maximize
revenues under a percentage rental agreement in light of
a provision of the lease agreement requiring it to "use its
best efforts to obtain and maintain the highest volume of
business on the premises."

This ruling was made despite the

lessee's uncontested allegations that lessee "made improvements on the theatre not required in the lease, that the
theatre business . . . [was] seasonal and that the theatre
was closed in the summer months in order to maintain a high
standard of entertainment... ." (7 So. at 343.) °
In this case, the lease agreement expressly provides
that the:
Lessee covenants to use and occupy said
premises for the operation of a drive-in
theatre business and any business which is
usually incident thereto, and covenants
and agrees to keep the improvements upon
said premises, including all theatre
equipment, in a good state of repair at the
expense of the Lessee. (See Exhibit A,
Paragraph 8.)
Plaintiff-appellant has stated a valid cause of action
for defendants-respondents1 failure to operate the Woodland
Drive-in Theatre in a prudent and businesslike manner.

The

defendants-respondents had an obligation to operate the theatre
in good faith without allowing it to deteriorate. Defendantsrespondents have disregarded that obligation in their operation
of Woodland Theatre, and the plaintiff-appellant is entitled to
go to trial on the issue of damages arising from their failure
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to fulfill that obligation.

CONCLUSION
In granting Plitt1s motion for summary judgment,
the trial court ignored the substantial issues of material
fact raised by Woodland and relied erroneously on the overly
broad propositions of law advanced by Plitt. Woodland is
entitled to an adequate opportunity to prove its claims
of forfeiture of the leasehold and to damages for the defendantsrespondents' breaches of the lease agreement.

Such an

opportunity was not given by the trial court, making no
findings of fact relating to Woodland's claims.

Plitt and

ABC are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law in either
of the plaintiff-appellant's actions, and this Court should
accordingly reverse the trail court's summary judgment orders.
DATED this / Q

day of May, 1976.
BERMAN & GIAUQUE
Daniel L. Berman
Richard D. Burbidge
Randall L. Dunn
500 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
(801) -£33-8383

84101

Richard D. Burbidge
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
Woodland Theatres, Inc•
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L E A S E
:;~'tT*THIS LEASE, made and entered into at Salt Lake City, Utah,
".this 9th.day of March, 1971, by and between WOODLAND THEATFES, INC.,
a corporation of Utah, hereinafter referred to as Lessor, and ABC
ZNTEBMOUNTAIN THEATRES, INC., a corporation of the State of Delaware,
\

..duly qualified to do business in Utah, hereinafter referred to as
Lessee?

" . * " ' > " . •

.1

- -: : WITNESSETH, that in consideration of the payment of the rent
and the keeping and performance of the covenants and agreements by
the said Lessee, "hereinafter set forth, the Lessor hereby leases unto
the Lessee the following described premises situated in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah:

*:

• -*r- •:' Beginning at the Northeast corner of Lot 8, Block
• .
5# Ten Acre Plat MAM, Big Field Survev, and running
•-.:.rt-:-.thence Soutli 0° 08* 26" West, 572.63 feet to the
Southeast corner of said Lot 8; thence South 89° 59'
•fir c s w « s t 206.47 feet along the South line of said Lot 8 to •
"•*• the Northeast corner of Lot 16 A, Clearview Acre Sub...£*/ -division? thence South 0° 121 40M West,, 18.00 feet to
the .Southeast corner of said Lot 16 A? thence North 89°
54' West, 100.00 feet to the Southeast corner of said
V Lot 16 A; thence South 89° 59' West, 100.00 feet to the
-.-. T--Southeast corner of Lot 18 A, Clearview Acres Subdivision;
* thence North 88° 24• 50" West, 100.04 feet to the South- .. west corner of said Lot 18 A; thence North 89° 02' 30"
West 100.01 feet to the Southwest corner of Lot 19 A,
:.r.-^l £learview Acres Subdivision; thence North 0° 12' 40"
Bast 13.30 feet to the Northwest corner of said Lot 19 A;
•-- -y. thence* South 89° 59' West, 160.00 feet to the Southwest
corner of said Lot 8, Block 5, Ten Acre Plat MAM; thence
-:•:. North 0° 12' 40" East 573.07 feet to the Northeast'corner
" o f said Lot 8; thence South 89° 59' East 89,30 feet;
:.J(i ^thence along the arc of a 622.03' foot radius curve to
the right, 715.24 feet to the point of beginning; said
•*",£::.arc being subtended by a chord of South 89° 59' East, 676.48 f:«at
" "feet. And including a 50 foot right-of-way from the
irj.7.- -leased premises to Ninth East Street to serve as an
entrance or exit from the Woodland Drive-In Theatre or
. . - . a right-of-way of sufficient width to serve the purpose
of an entrance or an exit to the Woodland Drive-In
Theatre to Ninth East Street as required by law.
Together with all the improvements thereon situated and
• all.appurtenances thereto, including the swimming pool.
Together with all of the equipment and personal property
used in the operation of the Woodland Drive-In Theatre,
. as set forth in the attached Schedule marked Exhibit A.
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1. The term of this lease shall commence on the _____

:

day of

* !

, 1971, and continue for fifteen (15)

ye--, to . * i ^ u d i n * _

, M..

.

. j

2. The Lessee covenants and agrees to pay as rental to

j

the Lessor a minimum annual guaranteed rental of Thirty-Two Thousand
Five Hundred Dollars ($32,500.00) per year during each year of the

;
»

term of this Lease or any extension thereof. Except for the first
year of the term of this Lease, such minimum annual guaranteed rental
shall he paid annually in twelve (12) monthly installments of Two

Thousand Seven Hundred Eight'Dollars and Thirty-Three Cents ($2,708*33).
Each installment shall be due on the first day of each month of each
lease yearf commencing with the first month of the second year of
the term of this Lease. The minimum annual guaranteed rental of
i

.

*

Thirty-Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($32,500.00) for the first
year of the fifteen (15) year term of this Lease shall be paid by the
Lessee to the Lessor within thirty (30) days after the commencement :"
date of this Lease. The parties acknowledge that the Lessor has
already received Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars ($25,000*00) of such
Thirty-Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($32,500.00) prepaid minimum
annual guaranteed rental and that the Lessee shall only be required to
pay the Lessor an additional Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars
($7,500.00) within thirty (30) days from the commencement date of this
Lease and upon the payment of such Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars
($7,500.00) the Lessee shall have fully prepaid the* minimum annual
guaranteed rental of Thirty-Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars
".($32,500.00) for the first year of the original fifteen (15) year term
of this Lease.
^

The Lessee, in addition, covenants and agrees to pay as a

percentage rental to the Lessor during each year of the term of this
Lease or any extension thereof:

'

.

..-••'

A. Fifteen percent .(15%) of the gross admission
receipts, if any, of the Theatre in excess
• . •'
of One Hundred Eighty-Three Thousand Three
Hundred and Thirty-Three Dollars ($183,333.00),
. and
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c.

Fifteen percent (15%) of the gross concession
receipts, if any, of the Theatre in excess
of Sixty-Five Thousand'Dollars ($65,000.00) .
i

The gross admission receipts and gross concession receipts of the
Theatre upon which the determination of the percentage rental, if any,
due under this Lease are to be computed, shall be calculated at the
end of each year of the. term of this Lease and the amount of percentage
rental, if any, due the Lessor as percentage rental shall be paid by
the Lessee without demand no later than thirty (30) days after the
end of each such lease year. A written statement of gross admission
receipts and of gross concession receipts, certified to be correct by
a financial officer of Lessee, shall be delivered by Lessee to Lessor
within such thirty (30) day period regardless of whether any percentage rental is due under the Lease.
' The Lessee shall regularly 'keep proper books of account
showing gross admission receipts and gross concession receipts from
the Theatre, which books shall during regular business hours of the
Lessee be open to the inspection of .Lessor and its agents at Lessee's
office in Salt Lake City, Utah*
Gross admission receipts as used for purposes of this Lease
shall mean the total receipts for admission to the Theatre, including
all ticket sales, less any and all taxes and license fees applicable
to such admission receipts required to be paid by any governmental
authority, whether local, county, city, state or federal.
Gross concession receipts as used for purposes of this Lease
shall mean any receipts from the sale of concession commodities,
including snack bar sales; food-, candy, and soft drinks on the Theatre
premises, less any and all taxes and license fees applicable to any
such gross concession receipts required to be paid by any governmental
authority, whether local, county, city, state or federal.
The Lessee in no way guarantees that there shall be any
percentage rental earned and due and'payable under the terms and
conditions, of this Lease.
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Lease year shall mean a period of twelve (12) consecutive
calendar months during the term of this Lease, measured from the first
day of the first full calendar month of the term of this Lease and
ending on the day prior to each anniversary of said first, day of the
t

first full calendar month.

i.

! i!
t i

In addition to the annual financial statement with regard
to gross admission receipts and gross concession receipts provided
' for above, the Lessee agrees to furnish Lessor with a quarterly
statement of gross admission and gross concession receipts and shall

i
i'

make available for the Lessor's inspection the daily box office
reports.
.

.

3. The Lessee shall have thirty (30) days grace and no

. more in which to pay any annual percentage rental payment to the
Lessor from the date such rental payment is due under Paragraph 2
s.above. •_ t.^.y**-. .

*

.-•

4. The Lessor shall pay the general personal property and
real property taxes levied against'the leased premises during the
of::—. _:. .
term of this leaser, provided, however, the Lessee agrees to pay any
increase ToT taxes over and above the amount of the taxes for the
"year 1963, which shall be levied during the term of the lease. Lessor
. shall furnish to Lessee upon request a copy of each tax bill required
to be paid (in part) by Lessee under this paragraph as well as a copy
^of the bill for the 1963 tax yearT
5. Lessee agrees to pay all utilities, including water,
-heat, lights and sewer charges and Lessee also agrees to pay all
_city, county, state and federal licenses, or any licenses that may be
-imposed by any other governmental agency.
__

..

.-£—

No

paragraph 6.

7. The Lessee covenants and agrees that the Lessee shall,
: within six (6) months from the date of the effective date of this
Lease enlarge the present snack bar to approximately double its present
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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. size. The Lessee shall be relieved of the obligations pursuant.to
this paragraph if zoning regulations prohibit the fulfillment of such
obligations or government approval for such construction cannot be
obtained, but the Lessee and Lessor shall undertake to use their best
efforts to obtain any zoning classification and any approval

! |5!

• hi
necessary to the fulfillment of their obligations*

Lessee further '

covenants and agrees to move the existing marquee from its present
location to the northwest property line of the demised premises on
Seventh East and to situate such marquee of such location so that both
sides of the double marquee are utilized to advertise the present
attraction; to provide larger lamp houses, and to oil and chip the
demised premises, all to be done prior to December 31, 1S71.
8. The Lessee covenants to use and occupy said premises for
the operation of as drive-in theatre business and any business which
is usually incident thereto, and covenants and agrees to keep the improvements upon said premises, including all theatre equipment, in a
good state of repair at the expense of the Lessee, In this connection,
tKe Lessee agrees to replace any equipment, at its expense, as such
replacement shall become necessary in the proper and effective operation ofthe theatre' business. Such replaced equipment shall be the
e^ivalent to> or better than, that which is replaced. The Lessee
6hail3r keep the premises free from all litter, dirt, debris, and
obstructions, and in a clean, sanitary condition, as required by all
ordinances and health and police* regulations ? nor shall said premises
be used for any purposes which are unlawful, or which would render the
insurance thereon void or the insurance risk more hazardous. At the
expiration of the lease. Lessee agrees to surrender possession to
Lessor of the said premises and the improvements and equipment upon
said premises in a good state of repair, ordinary wear and tear,
acts of God, and damage by fife or other insured casualty excepted.
9. As a part of the consideration of the execution of this
Lease by Lessee, Lessor warrants that Lessor is the owner of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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perform all t h e covenants o f this L e a s e b y said Lessee t o b e performed,
•the L e s s e e shall and m a y peaceably and quifetly h a v e , h o l d a n d enjoy
*
*
'the said demised p r o p e r t y f o r t h e full term aforesaid.

kM

1 0 . "'The L e s s e e agrees that during t h e term o f t h e lease
<2iT.
• t h e p r e s e n t n a m e o f t h e theatre s h a l l n o t b e changed, except that
L e s s e e m a y indicate its operation o f t h e theatre, provided such

i fl

additional designation o r description shall b e subordinate t o the name
W o o d l a n d Drive-In Theatre? a n d the n a m e "Park V u " , o r any name other
than W o o d l a n d , s h a l l not b e displayed i n any marquee o r signature
.

"*.

i

display i n n e w s p a p e r advertising,
v

-

•: x i * T h e L e s s e e covenants a n d agrees that i t w i l l n o t assign

" this L e a s e o r e n t e r into a n y sublease o f t h e premises o r any part
thereof, w i t h o u t t h e w r i t t e n consent o f t h e Lessor, w h i c h consent
L e s s o r agrees n o t t o unreasonably w i t h h o l d , provided that the Lessee
m a y assign this l e a s e o r sublet the premises t o a corporation i n w h i c h
L e s s e e o r a p a r e n t o r affiliated corporation owns t h e controlling
interest.

I n n o e v e n t s h a l l the assignment o f this L e a s e relieve t h e

L e s s e e o f its obligations t o the L e s s o r h e r e u n d e r .
rerli-Cv.:.;-:.. £..3... ....;. . ;•;;.*..--:•/ ::. -.. . ;..

tier, ci

;

::;v:-i2#'rlessee agrees t o assume and perform a n y film contracts,

p r e v i o u s l y n e g o t i a t e d b y the L e s s o r o r b y the p r i o r occupant w h i c h
sfitay^nbt" liave b e e n liquidated -and performed prior t o t h e commencement
c

cEate*of t h e t e r m o f this l e a s e .

L e s s o r represents that t h e only o u t -

s t a n d i n g u n p e r f o r m e d film contract o r contracts a r e a s follows:

r .<••

I n a n y event t h e foregoing shall apply o n l y to film contracts w i t h
confirmed dates a s o f t h e commencement o f t h e term o f this L e a s e ,
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* 13. In the event said leased property or any part thereof

be so damaged by fire or act of God that the same cannot be used for
theatre purposes, the Lessor shall rebuild, repair or replace the
same at Lessor's expense, in such manner that the same shall be equal
to said leased property prior to such damage*

In the event said

Lessor shall not commence said repairs or replacements within sixty
(60) days following said damage, and thereafter proceeds therewith
with due diligence, said Lessee, at Lessee's election, may proceed to
make said repairs or replacements and deduct the cost thereof and all
reasonable expenses in connection therewith from the ensuing payments
of rental required to be made hereunder, or said Lessee, at Lessee's
election, as-aforesaid, may terminate this lease. Said Lessee shall
be relieved from making the rental payments provided hereby during
such part of the above-mentioned period as said premises shall be
unfit for occupancy for theatre purposes, and also during such period
as the theatres in the above City may be closed by the City, State or
Federal authorities under Martial Law, Health Quarantine, or other
emergency, and rentals paid in advance for such periods shall be
credited upon the ensuing rental payments to be made pursuant hereto.
14. The Lessee agrees to maintain fire insurance with full
extended coverage, including wind damage, at Lessee/s sole expense,
to the extent of at least 80 percent of the value of the equipment
and improvements. The proceeds of such insurance shall be payable
to the Lessor for the purpose of repair as aforesaid.

In the event

the proceeds of such insurance are insufficient to cover the replacement cost. Lessee agrees to pay the difference of such replacement
"

i •: * *

* '

cost.*
15o

The Lessee agrees to provide and maintain public

liability insurance for the protection of Lessor and Lessee, covering
the use and occupancy of the premises by the Lessee, in the sum of
$100,000.00 for each person and $300,000.00 for each occurrence, and
Lessee covenants and agrees to save Lessor harmless from any liability
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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premises by the Lessee.

,

.

J

^ •" " 16. Lessor grants unto Lessee the first right to purchase
a marketable title to the demises premises at the same price and
upon the same terms at which the same may be offered for sale to any
r;£r.,:' y. : * .--"••'

:

'

• - -•

~ \

:

\

.

'

other prospective purchaser, subject to the terms of this lease# and
Lessee shall have thirty (30) days after notice of said proposed sale
a*. ..--*...."—•••.".
within which to elect whether to purchase said premises. In .the event
Lessee notifies Lessor, within the time specified above, of Lessee's
!• t
i

•election to purchase said premises, then said purchase shall be
consummated within fifteen (15) days after service of written notice
upon Lessor of Lessee's election to purchase the same.

K
i

17. The parties hereto agree that in the event of any
litigation between the parties hereto to enforce the terms of this
lease, or pertaining to the tenancy hereby created, the court may
award the successful party its reasonable attorneys' fees.
•"ccrrr

="JL8# All the covenants and agreements in this lease shall

extend to and be binding upon the heirs, executors, administrators,
successors"and'assigns"of the irrespective parties hereto.
vriz-cc:. r.r.19*: No paragraph 19•"
.^ .

- r ; r v i. - ;

_ 2 0 . . ^ e Lessor covenants and agrees that the Lessee may

have an option to renew this lease under the same terms and conditions
xrCi c c r . . :.:..

.i

-II.

-

•'

'•

and at the same rental, for a period of an -additional five (5) years.
..Hotice of the intention to exercise this option must be given in
writing to the Lessor at least six _(6) months before the expiration
of this lease, otherwise such option shall terminate and be of no
.. \

effect.
_:

21. JThe Lessor'shall have the right to audit the books and

records of the Lessee relating to.the leased premises once each year
in order to verify the accuracy of the reports made to the Lessor
with respect to the gross receipts received by Lessee during each
year of the term.
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22. Lessee covenants and agrees that it will promptly pay

r

for any improvements or replacements of equipment made by Lessee to

|

the end that no liens or repossessions occur. Title to all iigprove-

1
J
I
I
^
I

cents.and equipment and replacements thereof shall be and remain in
the Lessor, and possession thereof, subject to reasonable wear and
depreciation, shall be given to the Lessor upon the termination of
•
.
.
*
i .
.this lease for any cause. ,
.... •

1

•

fc

*"

•

•

•

••

•

•

*•:

. '. j jti
.•*'•!;!
,

}.•!;

*23« At least sixty (60.) days prior to the expiration of

this lease or the extension thereof, the Lessor shall have the right
to exhibit a sign for lease conspicuously on said premises as Lessor
may desire, 'without seriously interfering with the operation of the
theatre by the Lessee; and at any reasonable hour of the day the
Lessor, through its appointed representative, shall have the right
to enter upon, inspect and view the premises.
.24.

4

(a) E||£ess£©~^^

Vr "JS jggaiiffQ^&j:^^
^ i t t e h hoid.ce .specifying

^

±6?

ijjEl^ans??^^
tiJESt^fr'ftA+•••^•'*^^^'M^-n^^'^^^^iTT^f

or (c) if Lessee shall fail to

perform any other obligation under this lease for thirty (35) days
after written notice specifying the default (or within such period
Lessee has not commenced diligently to correct such default so specified
ar. i

r .

~ •..

.; •.;

•

.or has not thereafter diligently pursued such correction to completion),
I '\J! X\T

< v, y
r\

O

i/j\

'"

••

the date-specified- in a- n o t i c e by., c e r t i f i e d . o r . x e g i s t e r e d mai^gff^hicly
c:

-•

"'--:. '.

date shall not-be lesa than ten (10) days after the date of mailing, of
ftu^ttotice'l^i^
be annulled and Lessor shall have,
in addition to any other right or remedy Lessor may have at law or
in equity, the right to thereupon re-enter and take possession of the
said premises.
The specified remedies to which either Landlord or Tenant
may resort under the terms of this lease are cumulative and are not
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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c

which either may be lawfully e n t i t l e d in case of any breach or
threatened breach by the other of any provision of t h i s lease..EffieSgj

p s r f o^ance-- pg^anyHlff

:

: a s

^ ^

^ ^
t

i^foiT^^Wfy?*^^

.»?

•

Irj

•Mil
cx. . . —

•ili

- ^^ i g ^ ^ intent of the parties that the number of notices

and the time periods provided by the applicable statutes of the State
t.

of Utah shall not be increased or enlarged, and if Lessee is given
the two (2) notices provided for in this Lease in order to annul this
Lease, and the minimum time periods provided for in this Lease, -efcfcgsa
^gi^X^ofciees^nd^uc^^

titarfiftfffj?'-ffl^r^iffS^5^^
.

.

-

-

.

s~r

^

.

.

.

.

.

.

-

r

fl^sfr*^

• • - .

m

.

:

-

.

.

.. -25. The Lessee shall make a surfacing application during

the summer of 1971 to the surfacing of the Woodland Drive-In Theatre
of the same grade and quality as was applied to such surfacing in the
summer of 1967, and, thereafter, the Lessee shall make such applications

. v --v-.- • .•..

----- - : - • - '

"

~J

from "time to-time as needed to keep and maintain the surfacing of the s
"Woodland Drive-In : Theatre in good condition. On or before T^Wisr&sSZ&l
jsgss^^iiTTTifiiT/>i97im Lessee s h a l l purchase four hundred (400) new 1,000
Tir—T""*-~*

-.•*"-•• '

. ". j. . •:

Watt in-car electric heaters with thermostatic controls which shall
become the property of Lessor as provided in paragraph 22 above.
Lessor "shall pay Lessee half the cost of Sctid heaters.
.*> • • . . -26. Daniel B. Woodland, Eugene N. Woodland and Patricia

\2fB~-±: -i . . ;.

. . .. 1

Hutchens, and any member.of.the immediate family of said named persons,
"

:

•

•

%

.

.

.

shall have the right to use the swimming pool at any time, provided
that such use will not interfere with the operation of the Lessee's
business, and provided further that such use shall be at their own
risk; and the Lessor agrees to indemnify and save Lessee harmless
from any claim, demand, or cause of action which may arise against
the Lessee out of such use of the swimming pool by anyone named in
this paragraph,
orby their
immediate
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27.

•

• •

*

Until further writtenrtc££&E?3any notices or communi-

cations required or made pursuant to this Lease shall be directed
• (JJ^reglitSr^^

follows:

• • -To the Lessor:
•.*".
'? ' " ..
. To t h e L e s s e e :

f

;

VV

. ; ; .
. '

.:

.j
•
'..-.•:
•

. •./' ...
"••• :/; :
'.

To Daniel B. Woodland
755 East 4070 South
Murray 7, Utah
TSr^£&£z&&03£^
.fi^We^tL&acond^SoutSftetf

.*;•

£S&£fciia3£^

f

iSJife^SSSlSfiffla^ra
iSs^t&i&eriea^B^r^
• &fct ^LJ^egal^Couns el-asss
i!330 Avenue of
^t^J^xieasaf
jito^orkj&L^^

. 28* The Lessee shall repaint the Woodland Drive-In Theatre
screen during the summer of 1971, and thereafter as needed during the
term of the lease or any renewal thereof hut not less than once every
four (4) years.
29.

•

i

The Woodland Drive-in Theatre shall not be expanded

on additional property or any entrance or exit added other than the
Ninth East entrance and exit, or any entrance or exit discontinued
without the Lessor9s written permission,
30.

Eugene N. Woodland may have a right-of-way over the

Ninth East exist and entrance for access to and from the property
owned by him which adjoins on the south of said entrance and exit.
31.

The Lessor and the individual stockholders thereof

(Daniel B. Woodland and Eugene N. Woodland) agree' to assist and
cooperate in every necessary and ^desirable way with the Lessee to
obtain all necessary zoning and other permits for use of the Ninth
East exit and entrance way and for all other improvements provided
in this lease.
32.

Neither Lessor nor its individualfetockholderswill

erect or permit to be erected on any property which they may own
adjacent to the Woodland Drive-in Theatre any flashing or revolving
by the
Howard
Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben
lights which Digitized
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any
wayW. interfere
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of the theatre watching the picture on the screen at the theatre,
and they will not cause or permit any loud or unuspal noises in
connection with the use of such adjoining property which will interfere with the operation of said drive-in theatre,
•

•

.

'

.

-

.

\

'

'•

33. The Lessor and Lessee agree to execute a short form
of lease, acknowledged and otherwise in proper form for recording

• n.
* .'is

Uii
! ;
.•»i;
! !'r
• " * ! :

t -

pursuant to the Statutes of Utah, pertaining thereto, This short form
shall recite (&) the date of the execution of the lease; (b) the

' * i;

' ,
description of the premises demised by the lease; (c) the term of the
lease; (d) the right of extension or renewal; and (e) the first right
to purchase a marketable title to the demised premises. The original
executed copy of said short form lease shall be recorded and shall be
returned, after ::recording, to Lessee.

34 • ^SSSEDB^
flOsBsijj?^^

o:. cu;;....-.. >A*...Lessor shall have received an offer from a
third party to purchase the premises for use
izir.zz. iL'v'cr'^O:.::other than as a motion picture drive-in
theatre;
\

'
. , iC.
'•"'•'

• • •, •
' „••':

hm Lessee shall have been given notice thereof
and the first right to purchase pursuant to
Luc-paragraph 16 of the lease and Lessee shall
have failed to elect to purchase;

.' Cm fessor^halt have given Lesse^M^^ssrVSS^
cvh.1.: z;':.—:.'k.-;. ninety (90) days advance written notice of-**
the effective date of such termination,, Jbujs?
.",'
the effective date shall in no event be
* 21. r./« during the.period. July~l through -Labor DayV\
'i^i.icl .
:-;Dw Lessor shall pay to Lessee (1) a sum equal
.'•.••;'.
to twice the amount of Lessee's investment
c:•:•--.•;• :•.*-•• ..':;•* in the Woodland Drive-in Theatre, which
•'•
•shall include, without limitation, the
tzt-LLii '---.:.--r.r:i. $125,000.00 paid by Lessee for the leasehold assignment, the cost of heaters, if
any, {and the cost of expanding the snack
bar, plus (2) if the effective date of/
""
, • .,•
• termination be within the first five (S)
years of the fifteen (15) year extendedjtesss^
. an_amount as follows:
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Termination Date
During

Added Amount

1st year

25?6 of amount under (1).

2nd year

20% of amount under (1).

3rd year

15% of amount under (1).

4th year

1(3% of amount under (1} .

5th year

5% of amount under (1) •

' •»•

•'i*is?•

Mi:

In addition, Lessor shall return to Lesj^^ee^Tny p^toaid
rent, including the security deposity^which would \^
otherwise be applied to rent for the' last year«
;:|

'I K'^MI}*

-

J

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Lessor, WoodJb^gd Theatres^ Inc., and
the Lessee, ABC Intermountain Theatres, Inc., have each executed this
Lease by thfeir duly authorized officers and attached their seals the
day and year first above written.
WOODLAND THEATRES, INC.

ATTEST:

'^.. : , ^7^/iy/J

MMMdkJ-

By

ATTEST:

ABC INTERMOUNTAIN THEATRES, INC.

^~r.

Its

SyV.
Its

^

'' ~

...X ,>
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